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Public health and governmental organisations should act in concert to stop commissioning research from 
market research companies that also work for tobacco companies.  
 
In view of the well-documented use of public relations firms by tobacco companies to foment opposition to 
tobacco control measures [1-4], public health professionals have rightly questioned whether health-care 
organisations and governments should employ public relations businesses who also work for the tobacco 
industry [5]. A strong case has been made for these public good organisations to sever links with any firm 
engaged by tobacco industry clients and to develop policies prohibiting the awarding of contracts to such 
companies in the future [5]. The importance of continued vigilance to conflicted interests that may impact 
public health is highlighted by the recent controversy surrounding the shelving of plans for legislation on 
standard packaging for cigarettes in England. This decision on packaging followed soon after the governing 
Conservative party appointed a campaign strategist whose lobbying consultancy advised the tobacco 
industry on blocking the policy in Australia [6]. 
 
One may argue that a similar issue arises with simultaneous use of market research companies by the 
tobacco industry and health-care organisations. Market research companies say that they have internal 
safeguards separating the accounts of tobacco companies and health-care organisations but it is questionable 
as to whether this is enough to avoid the serious conflict of interest that arises from making the companies 
concerned complicit in acting to the detriment of public health. For example, development of measures and 
methods arising from work done for public health clients must ultimately diffuse to the rest of the 
organisation to the potential benefit of tobacco industry clients. To the extent that the work for the tobacco 
industry clients is valuable for them it must be to the detriment of public health. 
 
A question arises as to how widespread a problem this is. A prominent world association for market research 
companies (ESOMAR) provides a ‘Directory of Research’ including a facility to search for providers 
associated with particular market sectors. Of the 766 accredited international market research providers who 
voluntarily report ‘tobacco’ as a specialist market sector, the vast majority – 695 – also list ‘health-care’ [7].  
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It would be unreasonable in the current commercial climate to expect individual market research companies 
unilaterally to turn down tobacco industry clients. However, it would be possible to incentivise them to do 
so if public health and governmental clients acted in concert. 
 
Health ministries and other public health organisations could combine to deliver a challenge to market 
research providers to sever links with the tobacco industry or face withdrawal of future health-care contracts. 
In countries that have signed up to WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, such a move would 
be consistent with their commitment under Article 5.3 that states ‘In setting and implementing their public 
health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial 
and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law’.  
 
The effects of such a policy need to be carefully analysed. One possible effect is creation of a schism 
between ‘ethical’ and ‘non-ethical’ market research companies. Another could be the development of new 
companies that specialise in public health. 
 
Some may argue that this would be the ‘thin end of the wedge’ in that there are many commercial 
organisations whose activities result in harm to the public. Would such a rule also apply to those? The 
alcohol industry is an obvious case in point. The response, as with any policy measure of this kind, is that 
each case has to be seen on its merits. With the tobacco industry, and companies that contribute to their 
continued success, the decision for public good organisations should be clear cut because tobacco is the only 
consumer product with no safe level of use and where the immediate cost to society is so huge. In more 
nuanced cases, an informed judgment may be reached by conducting a ‘Purposes, Extent, Relevant, 
Identified and Link’ (‘PERIL’) risk analysis to assess the extent to which a business relationship places a 
public good organisation in ‘moral jeopardy’ [8]. A PERIL analysis involves answering five questions: (i) to 
what degree do the purposes of the public good organisation and business differ?; (ii) does the extent of 
reliance of the organisation on the business compromise their decision-making?; (iii) what is the relevant 
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harm associated with the consumption of the product offered by the business?; (iv) to what degree will the 
business and organisation be visibly identified with one another, and thereby legitimise or damage the 
respective reputations?;  (v) what is the nature and directness of the link between the organisation and 
business? 
 
If one accepts that the kind of concerted policy action proposed is needed in principle, the question arises as 
to how to bring it about. A first step would be to canvass market research companies that could do the kind 
of work needed by healthcare and governmental organisations to find out which ones would currently be 
able to meet the requirement not to work for tobacco industry clients. If there were sufficient companies 
already, then it would be a simple matter to establish rules that such companies would be favoured in any 
contracting process. If not, then a discussion would be required with major market research companies as to 
what would be needed for those who would be interested in adopting strict policies on client engagement to 
arrive at the desired state of affairs. In the meantime, the incentive of future health-care contracts could be 
widely advertised to encourage the development of new market research companies specialising in public 
health. 
 
Tobacco companies might complain that their legal activities are being in some way restricted by such 
policies. The response to this of course is that, while their selling of a lethal and addictive product may be 
legal, it is anachronistic and unethical, by most modern standards of humanity.  
 
References 
1. Fallin A, Grana R, Glantz SA. ‘To quarterback behind the scenes, third-party efforts’: the tobacco 
industry and the Tea Party. Tobacco Control. 2013. 
2. Ong EK, Glantz SA. Constructing "sound science" and "good epidemiology": Tobacco, lawyers, and 
public relations firms. American Journal of Public Health. 2001;91(11):1749-1757. 
3. Apollonio DE, Bero LA. The Creation of Industry Front Groups: The Tobacco Industry and “Get 
Government Off Our Back”. American Journal of Public Health. 2007;97(3):419-427. 
Market research companies and the tobacco industry  Page 5 
   
4. Tesler LE, Malone RE. “Our Reach Is Wide by Any Corporate Standard”: How the Tobacco 
Industry Helped Defeat the Clinton Health Plan and Why It Matters Now. American Journal of 
Public Health. 2010;100(7):1174-1188. 
5. Hopkinson NS, Moxham J, Montgomery H, et al. Tobacco industry lobbyists and their health-care 
clients. The Lancet. 2013;381(9865):445. 
6. Pickard J, Stacey K. Questions raised over Crosby’s UK role and business interests 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f8cf83d8-b8c5-11e2-869f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2TFsuv7yg) 
Accessed 14th May 2013. 2013. 
7. European Society for Opinion and Market Research (ESOMAR). Directory of Research. 
http://directory.esomar.org/market17_Healthcare-Pharmaceutical?letter=all and 
http://directory.esomar.org/market27_Tobacco-Cigarettes?letter=all (accessed May 13, 2013). 
8. Adams PJ. Assessing whether to receive funding support from tobacco, alcohol, gambling and other 
dangerous consumption industries. Addiction. 2007;102(7):1027-1033. 
 
 
 
